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The variety and complexity of human-made tools are unique in the animal
kingdom. Research investigating why human tool use is special has focused
on the role of social learning: while non-human great apes acquire tool-
use behaviours mostly by individual (re-)inventions, modern humans use
imitation and teaching to accumulate innovations over time. However, little
is known about tool-use behaviours that humans can invent individually,
i.e. without cultural knowledge. We presented 2- to 3.5-year-old children
with 12 problem-solving tasks based on tool-use behaviours shown by great
apes. Spontaneous tool use was observed in 11 tasks. Additionally, tasks
which occurred more frequently in wild great apes were also solved more fre-
quently by human children. Our results demonstrate great similarity in the
spontaneous tool-use abilities of human children and great apes, indicating
that the physical cognition underlying tool use shows large overlaps across
the great ape species. This suggests that humans are neither born with special
physical cognition skills, nor that these skills have degraded due to our species’
long reliance of social learning in the tool-use domain.1. Introduction
The ability to use tools, i.e. to employ ‘unattached or manipulable attached
environmental object[s]’ [1, p. 5], is not restricted to humans. Chimpanzees and
orangutans—two of our closest living relatives—possess multiple tool-use ‘tra-
ditions’, i.e. tool use whose occurrence cannot be explained solely by genetic
and environmental factors, but which is also influenced by social learning [2].
Although these traditions are said to bear similarities to human culture [3], the
range and complexity of human tools are unique. Exploring the reasons for this
uniqueness, researchers have focused on the role of special types of social trans-
mission [4–8]: as Vygotsky [9] argued, humans’ capacity to imitate and teach
others enabled them to acquire behaviours that they could not (yet) have invented
on their own. Over historical time, this ability allowed humans to gradually
accumulate design improvements in tools [4,6]. In contrast, the evidence for imi-
tation and teaching in great apes is weak ([5,10–12], but see [13]), so that tool use
in these species is unlikely to be acquired via these mechanisms. The myriad of
human tool forms thus represents the current end result of cumulative cultural
evolution. This, however, begs the question as to what types of tool-use beha-
viours humans can invent without cultural learning. In other words, what are
the roots of our tool cultures—both phylogenetically and ontogenetically?
This study aimed to explore this ‘baseline’ of human tool-use abilities by
asking which tool-use behaviours human children would be able to invent on
their own, i.e. without cultural resources such as instructions, demonstrations
or eavesdropping. In order to determine whether a given tool-use behaviour
can be invented individually, culturally naive individuals can be tested for spon-
taneous re-inventions of the behaviour [14].Whereas for non-human animals, this
can be done with captive individuals that happen to be naive to the behaviour in
question [15], the case is more challenging for humans, as children learn how
to use cultural tools from an early age [16,17]. By designing novel tasks, which
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
283:20152402
2
 on February 24, 2016http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from children are unlikely to have encountered before, researchers
can limit human participants’ likelihood of drawing analogies
from their previous cultural experience when solving the task.
Therefore, we presented children with novel games and unu-
sual apparatuses to ensure that they would need to solve the
tasks via spontaneous individual inventions.
In order to identify candidate ecologically valid tool-using
behaviours that may be invented spontaneously by children,
we based our tasks on cultural tool-use behaviours currently
observed in wild chimpanzees [3] and orangutans [18]. This
approach also allows comparisons of spontaneous tool-use abil-
ities across species. This is important as one cannot a priori
assume that humans possess equal, worse or better basic tool-
use skills than great apes—this must be tested explicitly [19].
The ability to use tools flexibly is thought to require a range of
physical cognition capabilities. First, flexible tool users (of any
given species) need to be capable of realizing that objects can
be used as tools [20], of recognizing the tools’ functionality
[21], and of causal reasoning [20]. In addition, more general abil-
ities have been proposed to be required, such as recombining
information in order to solve novel tasks [22] and learning
from perceptual-motor feedback [20]. Finally, flexible tool use
is thought to also depend on a propensity for object manipu-
lation [22], an enhanced working memory capacity to process
the increased problem–solution distance of tool-use tasks [20],
and the ability to inhibit and switch between strategies.
Deaner et al. [23] found that some non-human primates
possess better domain-general cognition abilities than others
and thus speculated that these differences in general intelli-
gence might account for differences in these species’ tool-use
abilities. From this, one might expect human superiority to
other primates on tool-use tasks. In contrast, Ruiz & Santos
[21] argue that humans and great apes possess a similar under-
standing of the physical and functional aspects involved in tool
use. Another approach might expect human tool-use abilities
to be impoverished compared to other species: modern
human intelligence is argued to be based on our species-
unique cultural learning mechanisms [4,6,7]. Such a reliance
of human intelligence on social transmission could have led
to the loss of some individual cognitive skills. Our species’ cul-
tural intelligence could have made individual ‘baseline’
physical cognition obsolete.
One previous study [19] used a battery of similar tasks for
great apes and human children to compare the cognitive skills
of these species, and while it suggested that children had more
advanced social skills than great apes, no differences were
found in the physical cognition abilities of children and
chimpanzees (with orangutans performing slightly worse).
However, the tasks used in this study were solely inspired by
human behaviour and lacked ecological validity from the per-
spective of the great apes—which are arguably closer to the
state of our common ancestor than modern humans [24]. Thus,
using great ape behaviours as the basis for tasks might represent
a phylogeneticallymore appropriate approach ifwe aim tomake
inferences about our last commonancestor’s cognitive capacities.
Our approach, by creating tasks for humans based on great ape
behaviours, now complements Herrmann et al.’s [19] method,
and in combination both represent a more valid approach to
the comparative analysis of human physical cognition.
The first aim of this study was to investigate whether chil-
dren between 2 and 3.5 years would be able to spontaneously
invent tool-use behaviours required to solve naturally occur-
ring problems that wild great apes solve. For this, we createdthe Great Ape Tool Test Battery (GATTeB), containing 12
tasks derived from cultural tool behaviours observed in
wild chimpanzees and/or orangutans. To be able to conclude
that a behaviour lies within the spontaneous cognitive
capacities of children, we would need to observe its spon-
taneous invention in at least two participants [25] (positive
evidence from a single child was judged to be insufficient
as the observed action could have been produced by
chance; see also electronic supplementary material).
Ifwe foundanoverlap in the spontaneous tool behaviours of
children and great apes, this would suggest, from a phylogenetic
perspective, that these behaviours were also likely within the
cognitive capability of our last common ancestor. With regard
to the ontogenetic roots of human tool use, knowledge about
spontaneous tool behaviours in children is generally sparse.
The ability to spontaneously use tools (such as sticks or cloths)
to obtain out-of-reach objects has been shown to develop
between 8 and 24 months of age [26]. However, whether
young children are also able to spontaneously use tools for
other purposes, such as extracting or perforating objects, is
still unknown.Thus, our findings contribute to thedevelopmen-
tal literature insights intowhether childrenwould also be able to
spontaneously use tools for these purposes that have not been
investigated, and which are ecologically highly relevant.
Our second aim was to investigate whether tool-use beha-
viours which appear to be more difficult to invent for wild
great apes would also be more challenging for children to
invent spontaneously. Cultural tool behaviours in wild great
apes differ with regard to their observed frequency: while
some behaviours are shared by several communities within a
species, e.g. termite-fishing in chimpanzees, others are less fre-
quent, e.g. algae scooping [3]. The behaviours’ observed
frequency is thought to represent their ease of individual inven-
tion [27]. Thus, the tool behaviours occurring rarely in wild
great apes may pose greater demands on cognitive abilities
(e.g. planning, working memory) and/or motor skills
(e.g. physical strength, fine-motor skills) when compared to
more frequent tool behaviours. Would behaviours that
appear to be hard to invent for wild great apes also bemore dif-
ficult to invent for children in our study? To investigate this, we
divided the 12 GATTeB tasks into two groups (low-frequency
and high-frequency), according to the frequency with which
the respective great ape behaviours were observed in the wild.
We studied children from 2 to 3.5 years of age. We chose
the lower end of our age range to be 2 years as Herrmann
et al. [19] have claimed that 2-year-olds represent a meaning-
ful point of comparison with great apes. However, we chose a
broader age range than [19] for two reasons: first, our tasks
represent more challenging tool problems, with many of
them posing additional demands on children’s planning,
fine-motor skills or physical strength. Second, by allowing
for variation in participants’ age we were able to examine
whether any difference between low- and high-frequency
tasks was stable over developmental time.2. Material and methods
(a) Creation of the GATTeB
We based our test battery on tool-use behaviours described in the
current reviews of potentially cultural behaviours in wild chim-
panzees [3,11,28,29] and orangutans [18,30]. Where viable, we
transferred cultural tool-use behaviours to problem-solving
Table 1. Selected great ape tool-use behaviours and description of the GATTeB tasks.
behaviour (frequency) description of great ape behaviour description of task
allocated
testing time
insect-pound (low) use stick to pound bottom of hole to
break and retrieve insects
use stick to retrieve Play Dohw balls from tube by
prodding them
2 min
perforate (low) use stick to make probing holes in
termite nests
use stick to perforate barrier in box to retrieve sticker 2 min
nuthammer (low) use piece of wood/stone to crack nuts use clay hammer to crack plastic nut to obtain sticker 2 min
algae scoop (low) use twig to scoop for algae on
water surface
use stick to scoop for strip of plastic in polystyrene beads
to obtain sticker
2 min
ground puncture (low) use stout stick to puncture underground
insect nest
use stout stick to puncture layer of Plasticine in box to
retrieve sticker
3 min
seed extraction/nut
extract (low)
use twig to extract seeds from nut/fruit use stick to extract pom poms from box 2 min
marrow pick (high) use small stick to retrieve marrow of
long bones
use stick to retrieve sponge attached to sticker from tube 1 min
ﬂuid dip (high) use sticks to ﬁsh for honey or water use stick to dip for paint in tube 1 min
ant-dip-wipe (high) use stick to collect ants, then wipe off
and eat
use wet stick to collect polystyrene beads, then wipe off
into box
3 min
termite-ﬁsh leaf-midrib
(high)
use leaf-midrib to retrieve termites from
nest
subtract paper ‘leaf ’ from stick and use stick with Velcrow
at ends to ﬁsh for scourer pieces in box
2 min
lever open/stick as chisel
(high)
use stick as lever to enlarge insect nest
entrance in log or ground
use stick as lever to enlarge hole in Plasticine lid of a
mug to retrieve ball with sticker attached to it
1 min
termite-ﬁsh/tree-hole
tool-use (high)
use stick to extract insects from nest use stick with Velcrow at ends to ﬁsh for scourer pieces
in box
1 min
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tronic supplementary material, table S1), resulting in 12 novel
tasks (table 1; for pictures, see electronic supplementary material,
figure S1). Although the great ape tool behaviours are all exhib-
ited within a foraging context, we did not opt to use food as a
reward for human participants due to ethical issues. Instead,
each task was designed as a game in which children could win
a sticker. Stickers represent a highly valuable and desirable
good for most Western children throughout the preschool
age—and are thus motivating for children.
The GATTeB tasks were divided into two groups, according to
the frequency with which the respective great ape behaviours were
reported to appear in the wild (electronic supplementary material,
table S2): behaviours described as customary (i.e. occurring in
(almost) allmembers of at least one age-sex class), habitual (observed
repeatedly in more than one individual, but not customary) or pre-
sent (clearly identified, but not customary/habitual [28]) in three
or more distinct populations of a species were assigned to the
high-frequency group; behaviours reported to be customary, habitual,
present or rare (i.e. behaviour too rare to spread socially [18]) in two
or fewer non-connected communities were assigned to the low-
frequency group. Nine of the tasks were derived from behaviours
only shown by chimpanzees. Three tasks (seed extraction/nut
extract, termite-fish/tree-hole tool-use, lever open/stick as chisel)
were based on behaviours that occur in a comparable fashion in
both chimpanzees and orangutans, and which were thus combined.
(b) Subjects
Fifty children (24 boys) between 26 and 41 months (mean age ¼
33.04 months, s.d. ¼ 3.69 months; twelve 26- to 30-month-olds,
thirty 31- to 36-month-olds, eight 37- to 41-month-olds) wererecruited from a metropolitan area in the UK and a small town
in Germany. Participants were tested individually by the same
female experimenter in nurseries, a science museum and the uni-
versity laboratory. Written informed consent was obtained by
children’s guardians prior to the study. Each participant was
administered four tasks (two high- and two low-frequency
tasks, randomly chosen and put in one of the following two
orders: high-low-high-low or low-high-low-high). Each task
was administered to between 15 and 17 children.
(c) Procedure
A warm-up game in which children had to break wooden sticks
familiarized children with the fact that they were allowed to
modify and destroy material during the experimental session.
This was important as several tasks required participants to break
or perforate material and sometimes also involved applying phys-
ical force (e.g. ground puncture). The GATTeB tasks were designed
to be solved by using a tool. Based on observations in a pilot study,
children were given 1 min (termite-fish/tree-hole tool-use, lever
open/stick as chisel, fluid dip and marrow pick, as children
found the solutions quickly), 2 min (insect-pound, nuthammer, ter-
mite-fish leaf-midrib, perforate, algae scoop and seed extraction/
nut extract) or 3 min (ground puncture (as children had to apply
much physical force) and ant-dip-wipe (as children tended to
only slowly approach the apparatus)) to solve the tasks. Children
were rewarded with a sticker for each task, regardless of success.
(d) Coding
Participants’ behaviour was live-coded. We documented
whether children picked the tool up or picked it up and used it
Table 2. Rates for tool pick up/use, correct tool use and correct success for low- and high-frequency tasks.
frequency of corresponding great ape
behaviour
task
(nvalid
trials)
tool pick up/use
(% of valid
trials)
correct tool use
(% of valid
trials)
correct success
(% of valid
trials)
low IN (17) 17 (100%) 16 (94.1%) 4 (23.5%)
PER (16) 11 (68.8%) 11 (68.8%) 1 (6.3%)
NUT (15) 10 (66.7%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0%)
AE (15) 10 (66.7%) 9 (60.0%) 6 (40%)
GR (15) 10 (66.7%) 8 (53.3%) 2 (13.3%)
SEED (17) 15 (88.2%) 15 (88.2%) 5 (29.4%)
totallow 95 73 (76.8%) 60 (63.2%) 18 (18.9%)
high MA (17) 13 (76.5%) 13 (76.5%) 3 (17.6%)
FD (17) 15 (88.2%) 14 (82.4%) 14 (82.4%)
ADW (17) 16 (94.1%)a 10 (58.8%) 10 (58.8%)
TFLF (17) 15 (88.2%) 8 (47.0%) 6 (35.3%)
LEV (15) 12 (80%) 12 (80%) 1 (6.7%)
TF (15) 11 (73.3%) 11 (73.3%) 9 (60%)
totalhigh 98 82 (83.7%) 68 (69.4%) 43 (43.9%)
Ntotal 193 155 (80.3%) 128 (66.3%) 61 (31.6%)
aNote that children were explicitly told to pick up the tool.
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way that could potentially lead to success (correct tool use) and
whether they succeeded on the task by using the tool in the cor-
rect way (correct success). The rare cases in which children
succeeded in a non-intended way, i.e. without a tool, were
scored as incorrect success and were excluded from the analysis.
Data from eight children (16% of the sample; the only children
for whom video material was available) was coded by a
second rater blind to the hypotheses of the study. Cohen’s k for
tool pick up/use was perfect (k ¼ 1.000), and excellent for correct
tool use (k ¼ 0.874) and correct success (k ¼ 0.913).3. Results
Fifty children completed a set of four tasks each, resulting in
200 trials of which 193 were valid. One trial had to be
excluded because of an intervention of nursery staff, two
trials due to experimenter error. Four trials were excluded
after being scored as incorrect success.
Table 2 gives a detailed overview of children’s rates of tool
pick ups/uses, correct tool uses and correct successes. Out of
the 193 times the tasks were conducted with children, the
respective tools were picked up in 80.3% of the cases. Low- and
high-frequency tasks did not differ with regard to their rates of
tool pick up/use (see the electronic supplementary material).
Thus, children were motivated to interact with the tools.
Correct tool use was observed in 11 tasks (and more than
eight times in each of them), indicating that the majority of
the great ape tool solutions could be invented individually
by human children. ‘nuthammer’ (i.e. hammering of a plastic
nut with a clay hammer) was the only task in which only one
child used the tool correctly. Since this child did not succeed
in breaking the nut, and since no second child used the tool
correctly, we cannot rule out the possibility that this instance
of correct tool use was due to chance. Low- and high-frequency tasks did not differ with regard to their rates of
correct tool use (see the electronic supplementary material).
In terms of correct success, we found that in 31.6% of the
trials children solved the given task correctly. We also found
a large numeric difference in correct success between low-
and high-frequency tasks: whereas children solved 19% of
the low-frequency trials, the success rate for high-frequency
trials was at 44%. In order to investigate this difference stat-
istically, we used generalized linear mixed models in R
[31] with age, sex and frequency as fixed effects and a
random intercept for subjects. As we found that sex did not
contribute significantly to the model fit (see the electronic
supplementary material), we dropped this variable from
the final model. Results based on the final model revealed
that, first of all, children’s success was significantly related
to age ( p, 0.001). With each month increase in age, children
were 1.3 (95% CI [1.1; 1.4]) times more likely to succeed.
Independent of this age effect, we found that frequency of
tool usage by wild great apes significantly predicted
success in the human children (p, 0.001): compared to low-
frequency tasks, tasks in the high-frequency group were 4.4
(95% CI [2.1, 9.1]) times more likely to be solved (electronic
supplementary material, table S3). Thus on average, great ape
low-frequency tasks were also low frequency for children and
great ape high-frequency tasks were also high frequency for
human children (note that not all tasks matched this pattern,
see the electronic supplementary material).
We did not find an interaction between age and frequency,
i.e. although older children were more successful than younger
ones across all tasks, they were still experiencing the low-
frequency tasks as more difficult than the high-frequency
tasks. The frequency effect was thus stable over the age
range. Whether this suggests that the frequency and age effects
reflect distinctive or common underlying factors remains open
to debate and is a focus for future studies.
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affected by the tasks’ allocation of differing amounts of
times for their completion (1, 2 or 3 min), we reran the
model and included a fixed effect for time. Results showed
that time did not make any significant contribution in the
model (x2(1) ¼ 0.560, p ¼ 0.454).ypublishing.org
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Our study found that the majority (at least 11 out of 12) of the
investigated wild great ape tool-use behaviours are individu-
ally re-inventable by human children and that there is a close
relationship between the difficulty level of these behaviours
and individual discovery rates for both humans and great
apes. Unlike a previous study—i.e. Herrmann et al. [19],
whose tasks were biased towards the human case—we vali-
dated our tasks ecologically by basing them on great ape
tool behaviours as described in the wild. Thus, our study pre-
sents phylogenetically more appropriate tasks for the study
of the physical cognition of our last common ancestor.
Children showed spontaneous tool use in the majority of
our tasks, suggesting that nearly all of the studied behaviours
lie within the realm of what humans can invent without
observing the solution or having it demonstrated. The large
overlap between the behaviours that can be invented spon-
taneously by great apes and human children suggests that
young children’s physical cognition skills are at least on the
same level as those of great apes. These findings do not
rule out the possibility that there might be physical cognition
tasks in which young children outperform great apes. How-
ever, in combination with the study by Herrmann et al.
[19]—who presented great apes and 2-year-old human
children with tasks based on human behaviours and who
found no difference in the performance of great apes and
children—the results of this study suggest that ontogenetically,
humans do not seem to differ from great apes with regard to
their baseline set of physical cognition abilities. From a phylo-
genetic perspective, humans’ basic tool-use abilities do not
appear to have become degraded by our species’ long
reliance on social learning and teaching. However, to even-
tually answer the question whether the physical cognition
abilities of great apes (including humans) are comparable
or whether humans possess enhanced physical cognition
skills, future studies will need to present humans and great
apes with tool tasks completely novel for both (e.g. tasks
based on tool behaviours observed in other, non-primate
species and which are not already known to be exhibited
by great apes or children).
Going back to our results, we also found that children were
more likely to solve tasks based on great ape behaviours which
occur with high frequency in the wild compared with more
low-frequency tasks, and this effect did not change with age.
Thus, it seems that tool tasks in the low-frequency group pos-
sess features that make successful tool use more difficult for
both humans and great apes, i.e. which make them more chal-
lenging for the evolved cognition of these species. A possible
reason for the enhanced difficulty of low-frequency tool tasks
might be that, whereas high-frequency behaviours mainly
require the tool user to perceive and select the correct affor-
dances, low-frequency behaviours may possess additional
cognitive or non-cognitive demands. For example, some of
the high-frequency behaviours may only require the insertionand subsequent retrieval of a stick into a hole (see, for example,
termite-fish/tree-hole tool-use, fluid dip). In contrast, low-
frequency tasks might pose additional demands on, for
example planning (e.g. perforate, consisting of two steps: first
breaking the barrier with the stick and then turning the box
upside down to retrieve the sticker; similarly, chimpanzees
need to first break the entrance to the termite mound with a
stick and then use a different stick to retrieve the insects);
fine-motor skills (e.g. in seed extraction/nut extract, the
target objects have to be retrieved dextrously); physical
strength (e.g. in ground puncture or nuthammer) or working
memory (e.g. in nuthammer, tool users need to attend to sev-
eral objects simultaneously). However, identifying the
specific reasons for the difficulty of low-frequency behaviours
will be the target of future studies.
Whereas low- andhigh-frequency tasks differedwith regard
to children’s success rates, we found no effect of frequency on
correct tool use. In both low- and high-frequency tasks, children
were equally likely to show the correct tool behaviour, and did
so in more than two-thirds of the trials. This finding underlines
young children’s proneness to use tools in meaningful ways to
try to solve even novel problems. However, whether children’s
disposition to use tools is also followed by task success seems
to depend on task type: in high-frequency tasks, both children’s
tool use and success rates were relatively high. In contrast, in
low-frequency tasks, even though children were equally likely
to use the tools correctly, tool usewas less likely to result in suc-
cess. This finding highlights that correct tool use does not
necessarily imply task success. Other cognitive and/or non-cog-
nitive demands have to be met so that correct tool use can be
‘translated’ into success. This ‘translation process’ seems to be
more demanding for the low- compared to the high-frequency
tasks (see above for a speculation about possible underlying
reasons).
We also found that older children were more likely to solve
the GATTeB tasks than younger children. This suggests a devel-
opment between 2 and 3.5 years of age of capacities allowing
children to more successfully meet the demands of the studied
tool tasks. Future work will need to identify these capacities;
potential candidates may be improvements in fine-motor
skills, visual attention, working memory, physical strength
and planning.However, we did not find an interaction between
age and frequency. That is, even though the older children in
our sample might have possessed better planning and fine-
motor skills than younger children, this did not suffice to help
the older children overcome the demands of the low-frequency
tasks. Thus, we conclude that the frequency effect is stable
across the studied age range.
It might be argued that our tasks were only based on wild
tool cultures of two of the four currently living genera of
great apes. However, wild gorillas and bonobos exhibit
only very low levels of tool use in the wild and thus failed
to provide the wild input for our tasks. Nonetheless, these
genera readily use tools in captivity—i.e. when a need
arises to do so [32,33]. Thus, while they did not contribute
to our validated list of tasks, they are no exception from the
line of widespread tool use across the great apes.
Our findings support the notion that the last common
ancestor of humans and great apes—living approximately
14 Ma—was already capable of the tool-use behaviours
studied here (and that they also found the low-frequency
tasks more difficult to invent). These behaviours thus rep-
resent a phylogenetic basic state of human tool use—and
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mission mechanisms such as imitation and teaching. This
situation matches very closely the current state of affairs of
great ape tool cultures, which represent ‘latent solutions’
[27]: i.e. the range of tools inventable by individual great apes.
Our study gives a first insight into the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic roots of human tool culture by identifying a
range of ecologically relevant tool-use behaviours which
human children—tested on tasks validated by great ape tool
behaviours—can invent on their own. In conjunction with pre-
vious research [19], in which great apes solved tasks validated
by modern human behaviour, we conclude—contra recent
claims [34]—that in the tool-use domain humans are not
born special.
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